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14 June 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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BULGARIA

ROBUST ECONOMY AFFORDS GREATER POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 11 May 84 pp 9, 10

[Article by Christian Schmidt Haeuer: "Coming Out of the Orchard"]

[Text] Sofia/Plovdiv, in May—Konstantin Chernenko's driver has just missed the boat. The May Day parade was over long ago and the portraits of the Soviet and the Bulgarian Politburo members have already been carted away by the time the forklift truck comes rolling along with the portrait of the Soviet party chief, making its way through the relaxed, smiling, well-dressed crowds of strollers. The nimble vehicle on the manufacture of which the Bulgarians have a monopoly in the East Bloc is giving the portrait of the leader of the power which has the political monopoly a ride past the equestrian statue of Czar Alexander II up towards Nevskij Cathedral. The bronze figure of the czar and the golden cupolas of the church attest to Bulgaria's gratitude for its liberation from the Turkish yoke in 1878. These two mementos also are evidence of the fact that the communist slavophiles on Russian Boulevard in Sofia never did make anything like a painstaking distinction between the old Czarist empire and the new Soviet state. The only question is whether the traditionally fraternal relationship is as solid as it always was.

While Chernenko's portrait was still part of the parade collective which went gliding by the state and party leadership posted on the balustrade of the Dimitrov mausoleum it was flanked by a banner bearing a slogan which is not particularly appreciated by Moscow these days. Side by side with the portrait of the Soviet leader rolled the slogan: "Nuclear-Free Zone for the Balkans." Are the Bulgarians—whose supposed allegiance to Moscow supplied the material for anecdotes and familiar quotations for years—now also looking for their own way beyond superpower confrontation in the direction of a "security partnership" as Hungary, the GDR and Romania have already done?

The answer is that the Bulgarians will continue to pay unavoidable tribute to big brother more willingly than some of the others. But by now they are using their own coin—as in the case of the imported Soviet-manufactured pay phones which still say "2 kopeks" and which also work when a Bulgarian 2 stotinki coin is inserted. Metaphorically, the Bulgarians are making

better use of the telephone. While Moscow cut off the direct lines to the capitalist countries soon after the Olympics were over, telephone calls to Sofia can be dialed direct to Western Europe. The existence of Soviet equipment in the country thus rarely tells all about Bulgaria's connections and achievements. At times, rather striking observations can be made in this connection. While telephone calls to foreign countries from Moscow are operated-assisted once again, Sofia exports more than 90 percent of its domestically produced automatic switchboards to the Soviet Union for economic reasons.

Bulgaria also continues to be the only East Bloc country among whose nine million inhabitants no anti-Soviet sentiments have taken root. But Sofia's readiness to act as an agent of the Soviet Union has diminished slowly but steadily since the late seventies. The first Slavic state in history—which was Christianized 100 years prior to Poland—is now openly conjuring up its past and is giving its crisis-wracked fraternal states a lesson in how to cope with the present.

Bulgaria, formerly an agricultural country, was the only East Bloc nation not to press for industrialization at the expense of agriculture. Today, it is faced with almost "West European" cheese and butter surpluses. To protect itself against the supply problems of the brother nations, Bulgaria at times introduced export levies of 200 to 300 percent. Although the country has no raw materials, its indebtedness to the West of only \$2 billion is the lowest in the entire East Bloc. It is one of the few countries in the world to register real economic growth. Since early 1982, Bulgaria has been carrying out an economic reform program which is aimed at decentralization but which initially has been simulating rather than stimulating the market. Moscow need have no fear that this /new economic mechanism/ will result in such capitalist excesses as in Hungary. There is no labor unrest as in Poland; no foreign policy escapades or economic collapse as in Romania; no peace movements and desires for immigration as in the GDR. Sofia did not experience a spring as did Prague and never ran into any problems with dissidents as did Moscow. In contrast to the Kremlin, the party leadership was rejuvenated early on and the average age of the members of the Politburo today is 55. Last but not least—in contrast to all the other brother nations there is no such thing as permanent dissatisfaction in Bulgaria. Todor Zhivkov, the 73 year-old head of state of party leader, may not have the same reputation as Hungarian party leader Kadar but his regime is at least respected by the Bulgarians who admittedly have had their share of woe throughout history.

By now, the longest-serving party leader in the Warsaw Pact (who has held the post since 1954) is entitled to some respect. This sly peasants' son who surely never studied Machiavelli's theories but has applied them with Levantine skill in ways appropriate to Balkan realities has given his countrymen three things above all over

the past several years: antiquity to inspire national pride; better stores and more vegetables to inspire allegiance to the system and an opening to the West to beef up the economy.

The National Wave

Throughout the country, there are digs and restorations to help reconstruct the continuity all the way from the Thracians to the first two Bulgarian empires (starting in 681) and leading up to the European Middle Ages. This is meant to show that Bulgaria's affiliation with Europe was never destroyed, despite hundreds of years of Ottoman domination and other big power dictates. But no mention is made of the fact that the borderline between authentic history and Balkan-type legends is an eminently fluid one. Almost everyone cites early Bulgarian history and Bulgarian cultural primogeniture among the Slav peoples with pride. Courtesy forbids the descendants of Orpheus, the Thracian bard, from pointing out that early Russian history did not see the light of day a good 200 years later at the time of the Kievan Rus. Against this background, it seems almost symbolic that the shortest line from central party headquarters in Sofia does not lead to the Soviet embassy but straight into the Roman era. From the main entrance of the central committee it is only a few steps to an enlarged pedestrian underpass where one can marvel at the paving stones and walls of the ancient Roman city of Serdica (so named after the Serds, a Thracian tribe).

The Consumer Economy

Contrary to all the forecasts, the lights have not gone out in this country which has virtually no raw materials at all. In contrast to their Romanian and Yugoslav neighbors, the Bulgarians were neither subjected to power cuts this winter, nor did they have to stand in line. Not a few Western diplomats stationed in down-and-out Romania have made a habit of crossing over to the Bulgarian border town of Russe to do their shopping where the offerings of the provincial stores seem like those of a supermarket by comparison. In the aftermath of the Polish crisis, good quality canned goods for export have been showing up in the stores with greater regularity. In a rather respectable seafood store—by East Bloc standards—there is genuine Scotch whisky on the shelves (costing the equivalent of 30 hours of wages) and the finest Russian export vodka which Soviet citizens have not been able to buy legally for years. The show windows of the food shops are full of crates of vegetables, lettuce, lemons and oranges—a rare sight indeed in the East Bloc at this time of year. This supply of goods cannot by any means be compared with what is available in Western Europe but if the customers complain, the Bulgarian sales personnel is apt to tell them: "Why don't you go to Poland or to Romania!"

The luxury shops on Stamigliyski Street—underneath the exaggeratedly stylish Palace of Culture and Sofia's huge main railroad station (Bulgaria's answer to the Frankfurt airport)—carry some French perfumes and German cosmetics as well as Austrian beer to draw off some of the purchasing power. Prices for items other than basic foodstuffs are quite high. Even surplus products such as butter and goat cheese run as much as a half day's wages by the kilo. But the monthly rent for a one-room apartment comes to a little more than a day's wages at 10 leva. The 18 leva heating bill, however, is almost twice as high as the rent. But the limited Bulgarian economic miracle leaves out the pensioners as well as families with only one wage earner. The current 5 percent inflation rate exceeds the rise in real income. The supply situation has improved enormously but the standard of living has hardly risen at all since 1980. The leadership of thrifty, if not particularly industrious Bulgaria knows that it can only safeguard the modest and still somewhat shaky economic miracle with the help of political and economic balancing acts. Since the country is poor in raw material resources, it will scarcely be able to loosen its economic ties to the Soviet Union anytime soon. Big brother supplies Bulgaria with all of its nuclear fuel, its hard coal, natural gas, iron ore, copper sulfate and even newsprint and with 98 percent of its oil and its electric power. But precisely because the Bulgarians need to make up for these natural resource deliveries with modern export products and precisely because they do not wish to remain the "fruit orchard" of socialism, they must push for intensive economic development and in turn for commercial ties to the world market and the transfer of Western technology. And this explains the the third—cautious—move Zhivkov has undertaken.

Opening to the West

There are two reasons for Sofia's reassessment of the world political situation and for its revaluation of national culture and history. On the one hand, Zhivkov wishes to protect himself over the long term against a development which has almost been forgotten in the West by now. Enraged by the almost Byzantine subservience toward Moscow, Bulgarian top functionaries formed a coalition in 1965 to stage the first military coup in communist Eastern Europe. Soviet intelligence found out about it ahead of time. To forestall any new dissatisfaction with subservience to the Soviet Union, the party chief began shifting the balance very carefully in the seventies. On the other hand, Sofia is concerned lest the still modest but for some branches of industry absolutely vital cooperation with the West (such as with AEG in electric engineering as well as with Siemens, Hoechst and Daimler Benz and with Japan in electronics) fall victim to superpower confrontation. "Modern Bulgarian production must have foreign markets," Yovcho Rusev, the director-general of the ministry for foreign trade, says. "Trade contacts to the Western countries have not been politicized and therefore have a good future. If we burden economic relations with politics, they are apt to become unstable."

Thus, Bulgaria's national economic interests have resulted in a foreign policy oriented toward damage control; to an orientation toward the European "community of responsibility." The visit to Bonn by Bulgaria's experienced, though still quite young foreign minister and Politburo member Mladenov this week is part of this picture. "If it were not for the missiles," Deputy Foreign Minister Ganev told me prior to Mladenov's departure, "there would be no problems. In the talks, an attempt will be made to look for ways of defusing the international situation."

Todor Zhivkov's support for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is a good example for the mobility as well as the limits within which Sofia conducts its independent foreign policy today. Since October 1981, Zhivkov has been a champion of this campaign which does not really have a chance to succeed but which is being supported by several Balkan leaders—particularly by Papandreou of Greece—for domestic and foreign policy reasons of their own. Immediately prior to the start of Soviet counter-counterarmament in the GDR and the CSSR last November Zhivkov pointedly reminded the Kremlin of Brezhnev's promise that the Soviet Union would "respect the wishes of the Bulgarian people" and forego the deployment of nuclear weapons on Bulgarian soil.

Sofia has an understandable fear of being drawn into the counter-counterarmament process after all. Western experts agree, to be sure, that the old /Scale-board/ and /Frog/ missiles which have just been exchanged for SS 21's and SS-22's in the GDR and the CSSR had always been deployed in Bulgaria as well (albeit without nuclear warheads). But any SS-21 and SS-22 deployment in Bulgaria would make for a qualitative change, since this would call for the stationing of missile support units—a small group of advisers would not be adequate to the job. For all that, these missiles—whether they were targeted at Turkey, Sicily or North Africa—would be of no military value whatever in view of the fact that all targets are already covered by the SS-20's. They would amount to a "psychological equalization of burdens" to conciliate a miffed GDR and CSSR. The deployment of these missiles would create even closer military ties between Sofia and Moscow but at the same time make Bulgaria more vulnerable militarily and less credible once again with regard to its foreign policy.

According to some news reports, preparations have already begun for the deployment of the new missile generation in Bulgaria; but this is unlikely. Since such deployment would be less of a military step than a political demonstration, it would probably be accompanied by public statements. Under the circumstances, it cannot be ruled out entirely that the rumors concerning Soviet deployment plans—which have been publicized by the Yugoslav media in particular—may in fact have been floated by the Bulgarians themselves—in order to forestall any such move. "They have not yet been asked in which case they would have to assent anyway," a seasoned observer of the Bulgarian scene says. "That is why they are doing everything they can to keep from being asked."

That this may indeed be the Bulgarian gambit was reflected in the most recent, pointed denial put out by the Bulgarian news agency BTA. "The mass media in several West European countries have recently maintained that Soviet nuclear missiles are being installed on the territory of the Bulgarian People's Republic or that preparatory work is under way," the BTA statement ran. "BTA has been authorized to state that these reports do not in any way correspond to the truth. There are no nuclear missiles in Bulgaria...The issue of the deployment of Soviet missiles on Bulgarian soil has not been a matter for debate, nor has it been discussed at any level by any forum...Bulgaria actively supports the idea of transforming the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone. The realization of this idea would thwart NATO plans for the preparation of nuclear war in this region as well."

True to the flexible stance adopted by Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria is keeping all the doors open, of course. Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ganev told me that Bulgaria has never had better relations with her neighbors than she does at present. Initial talks on a nuclear-free zone, he said, also went satisfactorily and discussions will continue. On the other hand, Bulgaria could not overlook the fact that the militaristic policies of the United States were putting pressure on the Balkans as on other regions. The issue of the deployment of Soviet missiles has as yet not come up, he said, but if the Western arms program forces the Warsaw Pact to adopt countermeasures, Bulgaria would of course have to meet her obligations. "We do not wish to have nuclear weapons deployed on our territory," Ganev said, "but if the arms race continues at its present pace, there is no telling where it will lead."

A secret door leading down to the deeper roots of the Bulgarian opening to the West and to Bulgaria's national policy as well over the past few years may be found not far from Alexander Nevskiy Cathedral on Oborischtche No 21. At this address, a house carefully protected from outside view by a black fence, the Zhivkov family used to maintain an apartment in town. Now, the third floor of this VIP residence houses the first and thus far only international foundation in an East European country. The foundation, which is affiliated with UNESCO, was named for Lyudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of the party chief, who died of a cerebral hemorrhage in 1981. As crown princess, she had tried with an almost feverish dedication to open Bulgaria up to the world, to Western culture and Asian philosophy. The international foundation which is "to study and popularize the noble ideas and projects of Lyudmila Zhivkova for the harmonious development of children and young people and the development of the creative principle in mankind" is to be presented to a wider public by its chairman, 32 year-old Vladimir Zhivkov, Lyudmila's brother, at Vienna's Hotel Sacher in late May.

Lyudmila Zhivkova's rise to the post of minister of culture, to membership in the Politburo and her father's potential successor allowed the long pent-up feeling of cultural superiority of the Bulgarians vis-a-vis

the "younger" Russian brothers to break out into the open. The /First Lady/, who had studied at Oxford and elsewhere; who dressed like a modern replica of the British Queen; who accompanied and advised her father on his trips to the West; who leaned toward Asian mysticism, yoga and the Kabbalah; who addressed communist functionaries on the subject of the "sonorous vibrations of the seven-step harmony of the eternal"—this unusual and inscrutable woman was quite unique among East Europe bureaucratic administrators of materialist philosophy. No member of a communist Politburo ever organized exhibits which made the rounds of the Western world as Lyudmila Zhivkova did—including one on Leonardo da Vinci and another on the gold treasures of the Thracians.

No wonder that some Bulgarians still believe in the speculations spread by refugees to the effect that certain political forces were responsible for Lyudmila Zhivkova's sudden death. But even if this rumor seems absurd, it is certainly the case that there were not a few East Bloc functionaries who were relieved at the thought that political responsibility once more rested with Todor Zhivkov alone—because while this unusual woman was still alive, the difference between father and daughter became increasingly marked. In contrast to the party chief who has held his post for 30 years, Lyudmila Zhivkova would surely not have been able to hold Bulgaria to her tranquil course.

Todor Zhivkov has led his country back to this course—but not back into the isolation of former years. In the cultural and ideological sectors some of Lyudmila's closest allies have been removed from the front lines. But the cultural opening and the return to her own traditions and legends have changed Bulgaria and are continuing to do so.

And so, part of the Lyudmila Zhivkova legacy lives on. What has remained for example is the /Konstantin Kyril National School for Ancient Languages and Cultures/ founded at her behest in 1979. In this institution which thus far has remained the only one of its kind in the communist Balkans 400 students are learning Ancient Bulgarian, Ancient Greek and Sanskrit—subjects which had never before been taught in the public schools of socialist Bulgaria. At this time, 10 students from all parts of the country vie for each open slot and the number of those interested in being admitted is continuing to rise at a fast pace.

We watched an 11th grade class consisting of four young ladies and four young gentlemen in blue school uniforms—earnestly studying Xenophon's /Anabasis/. There is a map of Greece and Asia Minor on the wall because language instruction also includes culture, history and geography; so thoroughly, in fact, that every 10th grade class goes on a trip to Athens, Mykonos, Olympia and Delphi. The school's little prospectus states the goal which might equally apply to the whole country which is looking for its identity: "To foster understanding for the roots and the development of Bulgarian culture and the cultures of Europe as a whole."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NAVAL REAR SERVICES CHIEF DISCUSSES 1984 TRAINING TASKS

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 2, 1984 (signed to press 13 Jan 84)
pp 57-59

[Interview with Rear Adm Hans Hofmann, chief, rear services, People's Navy:
"The Members of the Rear Services of the People's Navy Set Their Tasks for
the Coming Years"; date and place of interview not indicated]

[Text] [Question] Comrade rear admiral! The People's Navy has at its disposal modern weapons systems and military technology which possess unusual combat features. This gives rise to increasing demands upon the rear security of the People's Navy. What are these demands and how should they be met in the future?



[Answer] Modern weaponry and military technology always embody the currently highest state of scientific-engineering progress, the currently highest possible level of its military-political and military-technological value. Such weaponry is complex and complicated, requiring significant expenditures, extensive knowledge and readiness for its use, its maintenance, repair and security.

In its modern battleships and naval craft and also with its other technologies of combat, guidance and security the People's Navy possesses powerful complex weapons systems and equipment representing this highest state of current technology. It is the task of the rear services of the People's Navy to guarantee a continuously high degree of combat readiness on the part of the fleet forces in addition to providing rapid reestablishment of the combat readiness of these forces after their engagement. At the same time we take into account that complex weapons systems such as those to be found in our battleships must also be given security within the large context.

Thus the activity of the members of the rear services encompasses security of the base together with material, technological, medical and chemical security, search and rescue, naval pioneer security and finally transport security.

Every new type of battleship, every new weapons complex brings with it higher demands upon its security. It is of primary importance to learn to master technological processes, to guarantee maintenance and repair. This places ever new and ever higher claims upon the training and further training of members of the army and civilian employees in the use of repair equipment, but it also places demands upon the training of all other members of the rear services who must either indirectly or directly guarantee storage, transport, regulatory, clarifying and transfer processes in the interest of the forces of the People's Navy.

New acquisitions, refittings and modernizations are everyday features of military activity. They become rapidly effective in the further enhancement of combat power and battle readiness only when there is mastery of all associated processes of planning, training, use, repair, etc. Prerequisites for this are a consciousness of political responsibility, military skill, technical knowledge and military-economic thinking and acting on the part of all members of the People's Navy.

In order to keep up with the growing demands upon security, with qualitatively new weapons systems and combat technology in the People's Navy we concentrate our efforts especially upon the requisite preliminaries. By this we understand:

First: prompt planning and training of the cadres and of the personnel of the rear services must have as its goal a broad mastery of the weapons systems and combat technology right from the moment of their introduction.

Second: it is necessary to enhance the scope and level of knowledge, abilities and competences of the members of the rear services in the many-sided aspects of rear security in terms of time and current standards in the interest of keeping up with new technology.

Third: the level of military-engineering and military-economic propaganda must be continuously improved and perfected in the interest of the political-ideological education of the members of our rear services.

[Question] One of the foundations of the high combat readiness is training at sea. There are many tasks which must be thus accomplished at sea and not in port. How are the members of the rear services of the People's Navy to deal adequately with this problem?

[Answer] The status of the combat readiness of the fleet forces can only be determined by the results of a rigorous, purposeful, close-to-combat training maintaining every feature of security. Ever more we hear the demand that there be rear security for battleships and battle craft at sea, in other words for ships immediately within their theater of action.

Security at sea on the one hand guarantees full utilization of the available training time while on the other hand it is a very effective method militarily-economically for the People's Navy. Thus, for example, long trips consuming much fuel between us and the base points can be diminished, presence at sea extended and not least of all both the crews and also the battleships as well as auxiliary ships can strengthen and enhance their knowledge, capabilities and readiness continuously in rear security operating at sea.

In recent years the rear services of the People's Navy have received more efficient auxiliary ships. With the new combat supply ships and high seas supply ships the rear services are in a position to provide security for battleships and craft at sea in the larger context. These ships have at their disposal modern installations and equipment for the transfer of combat supplies, fuel and other material necessities. Equipment variants in different combinations, primarily based upon the use of large, medium and special containers simultaneously permit material, technical, medical and chemical servicing as well as search and rescue.

For example, in the training year 1982/83 the collective which staffs the high seas supply ship "Darss" has verified the efficiency of this modern auxiliary ship in servicing the forces of "Squadron 83" in addition to establishing its efficiency in the firing of artillery, missiles and depth charges.

The members of the rear services of the People's Navy are aware of their responsibility in the total system of combat readiness in the People's Navy. With the help of personal involvement and with success they strive for a high coefficient of technical readiness for engagement on the part of the fleet.

The members of the rear services know that the efficiency of their activity is measured by whether or not the missiles, torpedoes, munitions, fuel and other material supplies are transferred to the battleships at the commanded time, at the commanded location and in the necessary numbers and quantity.

[Question] Military power and combat readiness are jointly determined by the military-technological equipment. What changes have there been in recent years in the various areas of rear services in the People's Navy?

[Answer] Basically I can say that by means of corresponding modern and more efficient equipment and technology the rear services have kept pace with

modernization of battleships and seagoing craft as well as with the other aspects of military technology in the People's Navy.

As I have already mentioned the rear services have obtained combat suppliers and high-seas suppliers which are usable universally both for transport tasks and supply tasks and also for technological services to battleships and sea-going craft.

At the present time the appearance of the technology of the rear services is characterized by a high percentage of mobile transport, storage and shop facilities, by regulatory complexes for weapons systems and also by the modern technology and equipment of the maintenance service, of the fuel and lubricant service, of the medical service, of the Naval Pioneer Division and of units of chemical defense.

In transport, transfer and storage processes both on land and at sea the large and medium containers are coming more and more into use. The equipment of our stationary, seaborne and mobile repair shops with new control, measurement and regulating devices together with repair devices and facilities characterizes the present status and further development of these shops. At the same time there is an increase in the fraction of equipment for mechanization and automation.

Scientific and engineering research and development work is a permanent constituent of the activity of members of the rear services. It is future oriented and aims at continuous improvement in military power and combat readiness of the People's Navy. I would like to offer as an instance of the practical effectiveness of the scientific-technical research and development the goods results obtained in modernization of mine and mine defense armament and in the domain of static and dynamic ships field surveying.

But new technology does not automatically result in greater military power. But it does impose more far-reaching demands upon our officers, ensigns, mates, sailors and civilian employees. In particular there is a need to deepen expert know-how, tactical and engineering understanding of correct and suitable utilization of this know-how as well as understanding of the effective application of this technology.

With the support of the party organizations, FDJ organizations and labor union organizations the commanders and collectives of our troops, units and installations had the capacity to create both the political-ideological and the technical prerequisites. This was demonstrated in the course of many training activities and in the course of exercises. Thus, for example, the Baum troop-unit through appropriate use of mobile repair techniques achieved good results in the domain of ship repair under field conditions. The Blumberg troop-unit has been a leading participant in perfecting the container system employed in the People's Navy.

[Question] As a result of scientific-technical progress and as a result of the revolution in military science what new demands have been imposed on the military-technical capability of the members of the rear services of the

People's Navy for the solution of the tasks confronting them, especially those tasks relating to all aspects of the security of the fleet forces at sea?

[Answer] The criterion for judging the effectiveness of the activity of the rear services is the successful fulfillment by our fleet forces of their tasks in combat service. Every member of the rear services must grasp the fact that his political and military effectiveness has a decisive influence upon the status of the combat readiness of the fleet forces. Scientific-technical progress in our portion of the combat forces magnifies the social and military economic responsibility of all members of the People's Navy. Such factors as

- i. the increasing application of modern technology for use, maintenance and repair;
- ii. the increasing intensity of the use of modern weapons systems and military technology and
- iii. the increasing level of maintenance required by the weaponry and equipment

place high demands on all those members of the rear services who must lead, guide and carry out these processes.

The factors which have been named require higher labor efficiency. Moreover, it is a question as to whether the members of the People's Navy come to understand the military-economic mastery of the process of scientific-technical development. The content of military activity has changed; it has become "more intellectual." It is characterized by the conscious creative cooperation of every member of the rear services in seeking and discovering new forms and methods in order to translate the changed conditions of maintenance, repair and renovation into greater military strength and combat readiness on the part of our portion of the combat forces. Here we take advantage of the abundant experience and knowledge of the Baltic Fleet of the USSR. Joint task fulfillment during exercises as well as personal contact with our brothers-in-arms have proven themselves to be a valuable constituent of the daily education and training of the members of the rear services of the People's Navy.

[Question] Solution of the manifold problems confronting rear security demands that creativity be used even more comprehensively. How can that be achieved?

[Answer] The complex of the tasks confronting the rear security of the forces of the People's Navy is to be dealt with under all its aspects only by means of politically and ideologically toughened and professionally well-trained cadres. For this reason we attach special value to intensification of political and combat training as well as upon intensification of the combat service. In the complex planning organization leadership and carrying out of training tasks of troop sections, units and installations of the rear services we see the key to further perfecting all aspects of security for the

fleet forces. This form of combat training strengthens the sense of belonging together among the members of our army and among civilian employees and among the crews of our battleships and sea craft. It challenges comradely competition and strengthens conviction of the effectiveness of the individual's activity.

At the same time it promotes conscious joint action and joint thinking as well as personal initiative and creative power. Especially under the conditions of revolutionary change in military science and the associated changes in the interrelation between members of the army and technological combat resources it is important to increasingly use the powers of socialist competition and to make use of the innovator's movement and the MMM movement. This demands especially complex leadership and complex task formulation because without the setting of a goal there is no possibility of checking progress and without continuous controls there cannot be any optimal results.

Although the tasks of rear security primarily are accomplished on the object of that security, namely the battleship, nevertheless there are manifold problems to be solved in the individual varieties of security. These can be better learned, trained and perfected when the existing bases for training are more effectively used and the trainers and simulators are employed more comprehensively.

Our modern weaponry and equipment, the supplies of fuels, munitions, replacement parts and guidance devices embody a high degree of economic value. Careful handling of all these, their care and maintenance, repair, storage, rotation, inventory control, security and not least of all their periodic renovation are military-economic processes in terms of which our results in rear security are measured.

In closing I should like to say: In the last analysis the important thing is to guarantee at all times a high degree of fighting strength and determination on the part of the troop sections, units and installations of the rear services in the People's Navy. It is on this basis that we shall contribute to further growth in combat readiness. To this end I wish much success and good future development to the members of the rear services of the seaborne combat forces of our republic.

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INEQUALITY SEEN AS TRANSIENT, UNAVOIDABLE PHENOMENON

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[Text] The SED Central Committee's social science conference on 15 and 16 December 1983 has been of importance also as a signpost for further exploring the dialectic of socialism. Kurt Hager's speech provided a summary account of the state of our knowledge in preparing the conception of the developed socialist society. Our party's practical experiences in implementing the social strategy based on it were generalized, and fundamental tasks were formulated for our continuing social science research. The conference most persuasively brought out the creative character of the Marxist-Leninist theory as well as our party's creative approach to the theoretical and practical problems in the continued shaping of the developed socialist society. Kurt Hager announced: "The conception of the developed socialist society forms the solid theoretical foundation of our social strategy. Yet it has by no means been completed but requires further creative development in line with newly gained experiences and our changed social reality. For this is a complicated and lengthy process of historic experience and knowledge constantly leading to new insights that have to be tested and checked in practical politics and, should they turn out to be inadequate, must also be revised."¹

Frequently insufficient attention is paid to this extremely important idea that we are dealing with a process of historic experience and knowledge. Then too little attention is given to the dialectical interrelation between socialism's social practice and reality on the one side and scientific theory, on the other, which gives rise to simplistic notions of the further shaping of the developed socialist society and of the later transition to communism. Some think of this whole process going on of establishing developed socialism and its moving toward communism merely as the implementation of a theoretical conception given for once and for all, of an ideal that already contains all the essential characteristics, features and parameters of the future society. From that premise, all penetrating theoretical efforts at exploring the developing socialist society in its specific quality, its inevitabilities, its contradictions

and impulses, would seem to be superfluous. The essence, the creative character and the strategic significance of the theory of developed socialism are as incomprehensible from such a premise as is the constant need for its being deepened and made more specific.

All development of socialism thus far has confirmed Lenin's well known thesis that social life in its reality and practice is much richer and more manifold than any theory. The insights gained by Marx, Engels and Lenin through their analysis of capitalist society form an orientation, a blueprint for establishing the socialist society. In some sense, that is the practical implementation of the theoretical model. But it is far more than that. Our theoretical insight mainly relates to the basic features of socialist society. The concrete ways and means for shaping it, however, their detailed functional mechanisms, must always again newly be laid and probed on that basis with respect to concrete historic conditions. Therefore, the practical experiences as well as the new society's developing reality call for constant theoretical analyses and generalizations to specify, concretize and creatively enrich our theoretical knowledge of communist society.

From this process evolved the conception of the developed socialist society, which may rightly be regarded as a result of the collective theoretical efforts by the Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist countries. It relies on the views and insights by the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism on communist society and is creatively developing them further. It fully conforms to the complicated dialectic between historic practice and scientific theory that when the development of socialism began there existed initially only general and not rarely oversimplified ideas about the further perfecting of socialist society and its transition to the higher developmental phase of communism. A detailed determination of the tasks that still had to be solved was not possibly in a speculative manner at the start of the way but in itself presupposed a more mature developmental phase of socialism. Those tasks also cannot be precisely formulated until the material prerequisites for them are there, at least germinally. So it is perfectly understandable that the conception of the developed socialist society is by no means complete but requires further detailed elaboration. As Kurt Hager said, "the Marxist-Leninist social sciences face the great and responsible task to explore still more thoroughly the socialist society as a unified social organism, more deeply and comprehensively in its functionality, developmental tendencies, inevitabilities, contradictions and impulses, in order further to perfect the theoretical foundation and instrumental devices of our social strategy."²

Only by creative theoretical efforts which let themselves be guided by the fundamental insights of the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism into communist society while they analyze the historic practice of real socialism can further steps, methods and means be determined for perfecting the developed socialist society. Precipitous, insufficiently sound or speculative conclusions and proposals for the continued shaping of developed socialism that are not based on the solid foundation of historically proven experiences and insights can do no good, however daring or even revolutionary they may sound.

To comprehend the dialectic of social development in socialism, in socialism's approaching communism, the correct determination of the sociohistoric and socio-economic quality of socialist society, as the first developmental phase of communist society, is of crucial importance. What is the essence and historically new quality of socialism? In answering this question, precisely, lies the extraordinary importance of the theory of the developed socialist society. It also implies a fundamental standpoint on how the dialectic of socialism and the further developmental tendencies of socialist society on the way to communism are conceived.

The socialist society at times is defined as a developmental phase of communist society in which, on the one hand, the "birthmarks" of the old society are not yet fully done away with while, on the other hand, prerequisites and features, "germs" of communism already exist. From that vantage point, socialism appears as a historically fairly brief condition of transition of society proceeding from capitalism to communism, a temporary combination of unripe communism with birth marks of capitalism. Such features of socialism as the public ownership in the means of production, the material-technical base of society, the new character of labor, the planned manner of social development, the public funds and so forth are seen as elements of a not yet ripe communism, as its "germs" that will further develop with the transition to communism, whereas such characteristics of socialism as the existence of classes, the essential differences between physical and mental work, commodity production, the commodity-money relations, and the performance principle rate as birthmarks of capitalism. In that view, the socialist society has no quality of its own at all but shows various qualitative traits that either are already part of communism or are to be counted among the birthmarks of the old society.

Such an interpretation of socialism has theoretical and practical consequences. First, it is inseparable from the view that such a transition phase without a quality of its own cannot last long. The ideas of socialism as a transitional phase without a quality of its own and of socialism as a brief historical phase on the way to communism condition and explain each other. Sometimes such ideas also are linked with Marx' statements on the lower and higher developmental phase of communist society in the "Critique of the Gotha Program." An accurate analysis by Marx' text shows however that there is no good reason for it. The fact is that Marx said nothing about the possible time dimension for the lower developmental phase of communist society, nor did he claim that socialism would only be a brief transitional phase of the new society. Marx and Engels gave no detailed predictions for the time frame required for establishing the first phase of communist society, nor did they describe the future society in detail. They strictly confined themselves to theoretical predictions that were scientifically sound because they were derived from objective inevitabilities and the developmental trends of society.³ In that sense they referred to the crucial criterion for economic maturity that must have been met for the new society to be able to enter its higher phase. That criterion they found in the sort of developmental stage of the productive forces marked by the all round development of the individuals and their productive capacity, the elimination of men's slavish subordination to the division of labor, and the contrast between mental and physical work, so that labor has become the principal need in life and all fountains of cooperative wealth flow more fully. Only then can the new society make a transition to the communist distribution principle, hence, to communism.⁴

Kurt Hager said: "Over what time frames the new society is going to reach this degree of economic maturity, that obviously depends on a large number of objective and subjective conditions which are changing themselves in the course of historic development."⁵

The conception of the developed socialist society, in full conformity with the historic experiences and the currently achieved developmental state of the productive forces of socialism, assumes that the shaping and perfecting of the developed socialist society is a lengthy historical process of penetrating qualitative and quantitative political, economic, social and intellectual-cultural changes. In its course, socialism, as the first developmental phase of communist society, comprehensively develops its new sociohistoric and socioeconomic quality and fully brings to the fore its advantages and impulses. Understanding that socialist society has a specific quality of its own which distinguishes it fundamentally from the previous capitalist society as well as from communism, although with it it already has important foundations and features in common, is of crucial importance for understanding its developmental tendencies.

What is this new quality and how does it appear in practice? Or, to put it differently: What actually is this, the specifically socialist quality, which distinguishes the developed socialist society fundamentally from capitalism on the one side and, on the other side, links it with as well as distinguishes it from communism? Developed socialism is a society in which the economic base, the social structure, the political system and the other elements in the superstructure conform to the socialist principles. That is the sense in which Y. Andropov described the developed socialist society.⁶ Still, what characterizes the socialist principles that have to be fully developed and realized so that the transition to communist principles becomes possible? How do they make their appearance in the reality of public life?

The developed socialist society is based on the public ownership in the means of production, the political power of the workers class and the working people's labor for themselves, freed from exploitation. It is a society free of class antagonisms and exploitation in which, however, classes and class differences as well as other social differences still exist. This is the first society in which men begin to control their socialization process consciously, and this by means of the political direction from the Marxist-Leninist party and the socialist state. On that foundation then are generated: the political-moral unity of society, based on the alliance of the leading workers class with the class of the cooperative farmers, the intelligentsia and the other working people; the conformity in the fundamental interests of all classes and strata while diverse, even contradictory, interests survive and are being reproduced; the specific role of material incentive in orienting individual and collective interests, by a distribution according to performance, to the implementation of the fundamental social interest, rapid productive forces development, increased labor productivity, and higher efficiency in public labor; and equitable friendly relations among nations and ethnic groups to create, through international collaboration, a socialist community of states and nations resting on peace.

These are real social matters of fact created in the course of establishing socialist society which now have the character of objective marks of developed socialism. They are essential marks and traits amounting in their totality to the specific quality of socialist society. They also serve, however, as the orienting guidelines and criteria for the further shaping of developed socialism and the all-inclusive development of its quality. Therefore--to put it theoretically--they also gain the character of principles of socialism. Because they are principles derived from the social reality and historic development of socialism, they can serve as an orientation and criterion for the further shaping of the developed socialist society. Looked at from a different aspect, the same objective features, absorbed by the social consciousness that evaluates them, also appear as the values of socialism and exercise a mobilizing effect in that they make men identify with the accomplishments, advantages and goals of socialism.

In looking at the developed socialist society and its quality from the theoretically generalizing aspect of the principles, we may then say: the principle of the public ownership in the means of production, the principle of material incentive, the principle of collectivism, the principle of internationalism and the principle of peace hold sway over it. All essential elements of socialist society are subjected to those principles and are being shaped and developed in conformity with those principles. That holds true for all sectors, sides and elements of society: for production, distribution, circulation and consumption, for the material-technical base, the economic base, the superstructure, the classes and strata, the nation, the family and so forth, regardless of whether they stem, historically, from the previous society or were newly created in the socialist society. The productive forces are largely taken over from capitalist society but transformed and developed in conformity with socialist principles and goals; the production relations are newly created and further developed in socialism on the basis of public property. Commodity production and the commodity-money relations are taken over from capitalist society but qualitatively changed in character. Much the same applies to the educational system and cultural institutions and to such social organizational forms as the family or the classes or the nation. What Marx said in the "Critique of the Gotha Program" about commodity production, that its "content and form" are changed,⁷ applies, mutatis mutandis, to all elements of socialist society that were historically derived from the old society.

That then also makes it completely mistaken to interpret all elements in socialist society that, historically, originated in capitalist society as "birthmarks" of capitalism. What Marx wanted to designate by this metaphor, obviously borrowed from the process of biological evolution and suggesting a certain analogy with heredity, are not, after all, distinct sectors, sides or elements of public life but, instead, specific traits of the social organism. In saying: "What we are dealing with here is a communist society, not as it has developed upon its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it is emerging out of capitalist society; consequently, a society which still bears, in every respect, economic, moral and intellectual, the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it is issuing,"⁸ it does not relate, as it were, to commodity production, money circulation, the distribution according to performance and such, as is often supposed, but to the degree of maturity in the "economic state of society and the stage of social civilization conditioned by it," which expresses itself in quite distinct traits of socialist society.

In saying that the socialist society still is encumbered with the birthmarks of the old society, that mainly means that the developmental stage of the productive forces despite all the enormous advances already made does not yet suffice to establish full social equality among all individuals, that this level of the productive forces still has some of the property of reproducing certain elements of social inequality. Not the socialist performance principle is a birthmark of capitalism, but the circumstance that the stage of productive forces development up to now and the productivity and efficiency of labor still do not make possible proceeding toward the higher principle of distribution according to needs. It follows precisely from this degree of social maturation, necessarily so, that in socialism everyone receives his individual share in social wealth according to the degree of labor performed, which is the same for all. "The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality consists in measuring this right by an equal standard: labor."⁹

Marx explicitly calls it "progress" and yet points out that this "equal right is still encumbered with bourgeois limitations,"¹⁰ because it does not mean social equality but the equality of the standard in evaluating each. "It recognizes no class distinctions because everyone is only a worker like everybody else; but it tacitly recognizes the inequality of individual endowment and therefore productive capacity, as natural privileges. It is therefore a right of inequality, in its substance, as is all right." Not the new socialist right that was created in conformity with the principles of socialism and serves as a tool to materialize these principles ever more fully is a birthmark of the old society, but the economically conditioned circumstance it is that society at the stage reached in the productive forces and of the social civilization conditioned by it needs legal arrangements for human relations in production, distribution and consumption and cannot yet proceed toward a higher form of regulating social conduct. "Right can never be on a higher level than the economic state of society and the stage of social civilization conditioned by it."¹²

It is necessary in this context to return once more to the Marx quote that in this lower developmental phase of the new society we are dealing with a communist society "not as it has developed upon its own foundation, but on the contrary, just as it is emerging out of capitalist society."¹³ Can this formulation be related in the same manner to all developmental phases of socialist society? So ahistoric an interpretation of Marx' idea evidently contradicts the principle of dialectical development. Socialist society as it exists at the end of the transition period from capitalism to socialism is indeed a society as it just emerged out of capitalist society. But it cannot be held equal with the developed socialist society which, starting from that point, has already to a large extent, after a process of decades in being further shaped, produced its own material-technical and socioeconomic foundations and has gone through an upward development on this foundation as primarily created by itself. Without wanting to ignore that not all historically transmitted foundations of social development have been transformed or, let alone, newly created at this stage--the territorial structure of the productive forces taken over, certain settlement structures, or the system of the social division of labor, e.g., are likely to have a more long-range effect--it is yet a fact that in the developed socialist society decisive foundations already have received a qualitatively new character. The further shaping of the developed socialist society

characteristically has already developed on socialism's own foundations. This society can no longer be considered as having just emerged out of capitalism; socialist society has a fairly long development behind it, largely on its own foundations.

From this the question logically follows whether the birthmarks of capitalism should be regarded as a fixed entity, as unalterable traits describing socialism always in the same way, regardless of its stage of development, or are subject to changes themselves. Should one not assume that such parameters of its inherited characteristics as the sphere, degree and intensity of its effect weaken to the extent that the quality of socialism is fully formed? Do the features of the new social organism that are correctly called birthmarks of capitalism not lose their weight in relative terms without having already fully disappeared? To arrive at detailed insights into this, concrete explorations would be needed about the changes in the social reality of socialism. One should also have to explore what influence may come from the fact that real socialism is developing in competition with capitalism and, through the world market, the international division of labor and other spheres, has close economic, political, scientific-technical and cultural interaction with capitalism.

In returning once more to the question of the sociohistoric and socioeconomic quality of developed socialism, we may define it as follows: The specific quality of developed socialism is that it is a society that is based on the public ownership in the means of production and the political power of the workers class and is free from exploitation and still acknowledges classes and class distinctions, in that it has established social equality only as yet with regard to the means of production relation.

This specific quality of developed socialism separates it fundamentally from capitalism while the historic continuity is still shown in the form of the birthmarks of the old society. This quality of its own links developed socialism with communism because the lower developmental phase of the new society already contains of course foundations, prerequisites and elements of the higher developmental phase. They are and remain subordinated, however, to the principles of socialism in the lower developmental phase. The developed socialist society does not yet attain the quality that will be characteristic of communism, the association "in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."¹⁴ Developed socialism can guarantee, to be sure, social security and developmental opportunities for everyone, but not yet a free, i.e. all-round, universal development of all individuals and, consequently, complete social equality. That will only come at the higher phase of social development, under communism, and on the basis of a far higher degree of economic maturity. Not until then will it become possible to proceed from socialist to communist principles.

This sociohistoric and socioeconomic quality of developed socialism must by no means be misunderstood as a given entity for once and for all; it is being molded ever more comprehensively and consistently in the course of the shaping and perfecting of the developed socialist society. With it, it is characterized by inherent dialectical contradictions that are developing further in the developmental process of socialism. The dialectical contradiction between social equality and inequality that characterizes the specific quality of developed socialism, e.g.,

moves and unfolds in the course of the further shaping and perfection of the developed socialist society through a more comprehensive and consistent development and implementation of the socialist principles on the basis of and in accordance with the degree of higher productive forces and production relations development. The content of social equality (and inequality) is always conditioned in concrete historic terms. Socialism, as the first phase of communist society, marks a deep caesura in the history of mankind in that it establishes social equality and surmounts social inequality. It abolishes the deep social inequality prevailing in antagonistic class societies between the propertied and the nonpropertied, between the exploiters and the exploited, between the dominating and dominated classes and brings about the equality of all members of socialist society with regard to the place of the means of production by transforming them into public property. This fundamental social equality of all working people as the collective proprietors of the means of production forms the basis for the socialist society's ability to guarantee to all equal social security (jobs, equal income standards in accordance with the performance principle, a secure livelihood, medical care and old-age care), the same educational opportunities and equal civic rights. That in the developed socialist society is the concrete-historic degree of possible social equality. This social equality is a great accomplishment of the working people. It is an essential basis for the development and consciousness of joint basic interests in all classes and strata and for consolidating the political-moral unity of socialist society. But there also is social inequality in socialism. That is unavoidably due to the specific socialist quality in the first phase of development in communist society. To regard it merely, in an abstract and ahistoric sense, as something negative would be wrong because in many respects it plays a progressive role as an impulse for social development.¹⁵

This then also shows how unrealistic, theoretically unsound and practically harmful it is to view the qualitatively new social relations among the classes, strata and groups in the developed socialist society through the glasses of bourgeois class contradictions and reinterpret antagonisms there as contradictory interests, where the conformity in basic interests forms the foundation for the political-moral unity of society.

How does social inequality make its appearance? Due to the unevenly developed material-technical base and the system of the social division of labor, as to the various sectors, there are considerable differences in working conditions, hence inequalities, in labor, in the skill level demanded for it, in its substance, in the proportions between physical and mental efforts and so forth. The performance principle--as an expression of social equality--forming the basis for distribution, certain inequalities unavoidably arise in the income level, hence in the material standard of living. Such social inequality in turn affects the educational and training level as well as men's performance capacities, so that tendencies of reproducing such inequality arise. The effect of this objectively unavoidable social inequality in socialism is multilayered and contradictory, as sociological surveys have shown. While on the one side certain social differentiations are insufficiently developed for inducing public action to increase the scientific-technical progress and encourage reproducing the scientific-technical intelligentsia out of the working class, we often find in public awareness and human conduct strong levelling tendencies in that the performance principle is inconsistently used or is weakened. That ultimately is

due to that the dialectical contradiction between social equality and inequality typical of the specific quality of socialist society is not understood on objective principles, in its historic unavoidability and in its propelling effect that is aimed at the development of the productive capacities of society. Often this contradiction is viewed through the glasses of an abstract notion of egalitarianism and justice and given a negative moralistic value. And that also is the basis for deprecating or even rejecting the socialist performance principle as a purported birthmark of the old society.

Now it makes sense that from this objectively concrete historic definition of the quality of socialism as the first developmental phase of communism far different implications arise for the further shaping and perfecting of the developed socialist society than from any superficial notion that this were not a unified social organism but a temporary connection between germs of communism and birthmarks of capitalism. If one proceeds from the latter alternative, it becomes easy, of course, to interpret the crucial developmental tendency of socialist society approaching communism as pushing back and overcoming the birthmarks of the old society and nurturing the germs of communism. There are several variants of this notion spreading through Marxist-Leninist literature. Frequently it is being presented naively as if that thesis were self-evident.

An extreme alternative of it comes as the recommendation to abolish commodity production, the commodity-money relations and the performance principle as birthmarks of capitalism and the source for many contradictions in socialism. On grounds of wanting to make more of the principle of collectivism, the suggestion is made to organize the working people in extended "consumer communes" where the distribution of individual means of consumption could then be handled collectively. Such a proposition evidently is inspired by the desire to surmount more rapidly and purposefully what are taken to be birthmarks of the old society and to spread the germs of communism more rigorously. The nice intent, unfortunately, is the only thing acceptable in this proposition; its practical implementation would amount to the ruin of socialism, as we shall still explain.

A more moderate variant of the same idea contends that socialism had two different distribution principles, one according to individual performance and the other one, according to needs, to be supplied by social funds. The dialectic in the development of socialist society toward communism is then seen in that the communist distribution principle received an ever larger sphere of action in socialism through the increase in public funds, from which more and more human needs could be satisfied until one arrives at a gratuitous distribution of all goods. The socialist distribution system relying on the performance principle and the principle of material incentive is then obviously mistaken as a birthmark of the old society which should have to be surmounted in the stage of developed socialism already. Satisfying certain material and intellectual needs from public funds is most unacceptably identified with the communist distribution principle so that, from that vantage point, the socialist society comes closer to communism mainly by the increase in public funds.

That the distribution principle of communist society cannot be reduced to satisfying needs out of public funds was noted already by Marx in his "Critique of the Gotha Program." In his polemic against the "uncurtailed" Lassalleian "proceeds of labor," Marx demonstrated that from the totality of the social product

must be deducted not only the accumulation and reserve funds but also "what is destined to satisfy the needs of the community, such as schools, sanitary provisions, etc. This portion is very considerably reduced from the outset in comparison with present society (Authors: capitalism, that is) and diminishes in the same measure as the new society develops."¹⁶ In fact, there are public funds for satisfying certain needs in most capitalist countries, their size and utilization depending also to a considerable extent on the struggle of the workers class, especially its trade union organizations. Yet no one could get the idea to see a communist distribution principle in that. That public funds grow much more in socialism than in capitalist society is due to the socio-historic quality of the new society and the socialist principles, yet it does not mean a transition to the communist distribution principle. It would be incompatible with the principles of socialism to make the opportunities for education, health care, cultural activities and so forth dependent on individual performance; it would vastly curtail the measure of men's social equality as required by socialism and its development. The notion that with the further shaping of the developed socialist society the distribution of consumer goods to be used individually would become gratuitous makes absolutely no sense and contradicts the economic laws of socialism. An attempt of developing public funds of socialist society already in terms of the communist distribution principle can only weaken socialist society economically, undermine the impulses inherent in the socialist performance principle and its resolute application, and thus block the upward development of socialism into communism. That would also encourage unrealistic notions about the degree of economic maturity actually achieved and the real chances for need satisfaction in developed socialism, having more of an effect on raising the demand level than a performance willingness.

As to the suggestion to overcome commodity production, the commodity-money relations and the performance principle as birthmarks of the old society, replacing it all by a distribution organization in terms of consumer communes, the first thing to be said about that is that there the developmental stage achieved by the productive forces, the production relations and the economic relations of socialist society inseparable from them are as much ignored as the economic laws are that go along with this mode of production. The fact that socialism, and also the developed socialist society, holds on to commodity production, money circulation, the commodity-money relations, material incentives and distribution according to performance is by no means subjective caprice or a mindless toleration of birthmarks of the old society, but is an economic necessity given by the developmental stage reached thus far of the productive forces and of the productivity and efficiency of public labor. As long as the degree of economic maturity in the new society does not suffice for producing public wealth that would allow all essential needs of all members of the society to be satisfied regardless of their individual performance, no other real alternative exists. There is of course a chance, in an abstract sense, to distribute all available social wealth evenly by enforcing the principle of egalitarianism. As the "wartime communism" in the Soviet Union during the Civil War has shown, that may be a possible and unavoidable way out in extreme situations for brief periods, to safeguard the mere physical survival of the workers class and the working people under such exceptional conditions. But historic experiences also have proven that a socialist society can neither be constructed nor be viable on the principle of egalitarianism. A society

organized so much in conflict with economic laws generates no individual, collective and social interests that would work as the motor and as impulses for the development of the productive forces and thus make possible the upward development of society. The developmental stage of the productive forces of socialism categorically demands the kind of economic relations as forms of development that would make possible comparing the productive achievements of the various members of society, rating them by the same standard, making distribution accordingly. Unavoidably, at that stage of productivity of public labor the same principle must prevail that "regulates the exchange of commodities in so far as it is an exchange of equal values. Substance and form are changed because under the changed conditions no one can give anything except his labor and because, on the other hand, nothing can become the property of the individual except the individual means of consumption. But so far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of equivalent commodities: an equal quantity of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal quantity of labor in another form."¹⁷

Socialist commodity production changed, in substance and form, from capitalist commodity production and the likewise changed exchange of commodities by means of commodity-money relations set up the network of economic relations which, as developmental forms of the productive forces, propel their rapid development. These economic relations at the same time appear as the material interests of society, of the collectives and of the individuals, conforming in their basic substance yet also containing diverse and contrary, even contradictory, elements. The flux of these contradictions, their being arbitrated and settled through constantly restabilizing the conformity among social, collective and individual interests, generates strong impulses aimed at higher productivity and efficiency in public labor. The attempt at replacing socialist commodity production, the commodity-money relations and the performance principle by organizing socialist society in terms of "consumer communes" might at the surface appear as a step toward communism. Actually, however, it would be tantamount to economic stagnation, the loss of impulses for economic progress, i.e. the economic decay of society. What ramifications and consequences such an attempt would have in social and political-ideological respects calls for no further comment. The social and political stability of socialist society would surely be undermined to such an extent that the greatest perils would have to arise from it for its survival.

In the Soviet Union, especially in the 1960's and 1970's, an intensive and comprehensive debate was carried on in Marxist economic literature on the need for the commodity-money relations in socialism and on what made it different from those in capitalism. That debate has now come to a conclusion in the sense here discussed.¹⁸ For the phase of developed socialism, P. N. Fedoseyev formulated its basic position for Soviet economic strategy: "The practice of socialist economic management also has corroborated the fundamental thesis of the political economy of socialism that commodity-money relations belong not only in the early developmental stages of socialism but also to the whole first phase of communism, and also to developed socialism, remaining in effect throughout. That cuts the ground from under any attempt at skipping objectively necessary developmental phases and suspending the laws and categories of socialism as fast as possible."¹⁹

Hence it is perfectly clear that such notions of the further shaping and perfecting of the developed socialist society are unacceptable. They proceed from mistaken theoretical preconditions and from a faulty assessment of the socio-historical quality of real socialism and its objective developmental tendencies. The assumption that developed socialism's advance toward communism comes by way of surmounting the "birthmarks" of capitalism (which are themselves misunderstood) and of spreading the "germs" of communism is profoundly erroneous. In no way does it match the historic experiences of developed socialist society. They are telling us ever more unequivocally that further advances toward communism can come only by consistently implementing and developing the socialist principles in all sectors of the developed socialist society and by shaping its new sociohistoric and socioeconomic quality in every way. Kurt Hager generalized essential SED experiences at the GDR's social scientists conference on 25 and 26 November 1976 when he said: "As there can be no rigid dividing line between the two phases of communist society--taking account of what they have in common and what distinguishes them--the full unfolding and shaping of all elements in the developed socialist society is at once that process in which fundamental prerequisites are laid for the gradual transition to the higher, communist phase."²⁰

In further shaping the developed socialist society it can hence not be a matter of overcoming commodity production, commodity-money relations and the performance principle; what matters instead is to broaden them more resolutely still in conformity with the socialist principles and to reach through them the kind of developmental stage of the productive forces and a heightened public labor productivity and efficiency that will allow us to proceed toward communist principles by which to transcend the limits of commodity production and of the performance principle. There is no faster way to get there. As Kurt Hager affirmed at the 1976 conference referred to, the objective dialectic between socialism and communism is such "that the complete formation of the advantages of socialism and the total use of the effects of its inevitabilities and principles is the only way to get set for creating the material-technical base of communism and the transformation of socialist into communist social relations based on a high-level communist consciousness. Not until the historic possibilities of socialism are fully exhausted will we produce the material and intellectual conditions that will eventually make possible the gradual transition to communism."²¹

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Hager, "Gesetzmaessigkeiten unserer Epoche - Triebkraefte und Werte des Sozialismus. Rede auf der Gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Konferenz des Zentralkomitees der SED am 15. und 16. Dezember 1983 in Berlin" [Inevitabilities in Our Era--The Driving Forces and Values of Socialism. Speech at the SED Central Committee's Social Science Conference on 15 and 16 December 1983 in Berlin], Berlin, 1983, p 28.
2. Ibid., p 31.
3. Cf. V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," "Werke" (Works), Vol 25, Berlin, 1960, p 471.
4. Cf. K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," Marx/Engels, "Werke," Vol 19, Berlin, 1962, p 21.

5. K. Hager, op. cit., p 27.
6. Y. Andropov, "Final Speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 June 1983.
7. K. Marx, op. cit., p 20.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p 21.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p 20.
14. K. Marx/F. Engels, "Communist Manifesto," "Werke," Vol 4, Berlin, 1959, p 482.
15. Cf. R. Weidig, "On the Dialectic in the Rapprochement of the Classes and Strata during the Further Shaping of the Developed Socialist Society in the GDR. Paper read at the 28 September 1982 Session of the Economic Sciences Council of the GDR" (unpublished); M. Loetsch, "Social Structures as Growth Factors and Driving Forces in Scientific-Technical Progress," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, No 6, 1982.
16. K. Matx, "Critique . . .," loc. cit., p 19.
17. Ibid., p 20.
18. Cf. I. I. Kuzminov, "Abriss der politischen Oekonomie des Sozialismus. Methodologie" [Outline of the Political Economy of Socialism--Methodology], Berlin, 1976, pp 184 ff.
19. P. N. Fedoseyev, "Aktualnye problemy obshchestvennykh nauk v svete resheniy XXVI s'yezda KPSS i s'yezdov bratskikh partiy stran sotsialisticheskogo sotrudhestva" [Current Social Science Problems in the Light of the 26th CPSU Congress and the Congresses of the Fraternal Parties of the Socialist Commonwealth], Moscow, 1982, pp 20 f.
20. K. Hager, "The Ninth Party Congress and the Social Sciences," "Materialien der Konferenz der Gesellschaftswissenschaftler der DDR am 25. und 26. November 1976 in Berlin," Berlin, 1977, pp 9 f.
21. Ibid., p 11.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SED OFFICIAL SCORES NEW NOVEL'S ECOLOGICAL COMMENTS

Background Sketch

Vienna WIENER TAGEBUCH in German No 5, May 84 pp 14-15

[Article by Martin Pollack, editorial staff member: "Growth Rates and Dead Fish--Environmental Problems in the GDR"]

[Text] Andreas Flemming is a writer who looks into the future with some anxiety. The doubling of the lead content of the air in the last 10 years is making him dubious about the optimistic slogans about progress put out at every opportunity for official speeches; the increasing nitrate concentration in lettuce and other produce gives him anguished visions; industrial waste dumped into the ocean and rivers without any ado or regard for possible environmental consequences turn in his imagination into gigantic avalanches that destroy all life; the construction and operation of nuclear power plants beset him with fearful premonitions about a new and ugly world.

These fears and doubts are besetting Andreas Flemming, the hero in the novel "Swantow" by GDR author Hanns Cibulka, during a quiet summer on the Baltic island of Ruegen, and they also crystallize in somber lyrical pictures: We redeem ourselves from looking at dead fish by growth rates of the economy, is the way one of his poems puts it, disturbed by the massive interference of the national economy and its forcible growth in the environment. The fictitious author thereby expresses what many GDR citizens are thinking and often are saying quite frankly: The bureaucratic-socialist growth fetishism and the "ton ideology" fixated on heavy industry must be overcome, and drastic measures must be taken against environmental polluters. And this at once and without any false regard for objective surface-type compulsions that economic managers always refer to when it becomes a matter of giving preference to production increases over effective environmental protection facilities.

That such a massive critique of the GDR's economic system was allowed to be published is encouraging and symptomatic. It signals a thorough rethinking in this field also. Only 10 or even 5 years ago, such publications would hardly have made it out of the editor's drawer into the printing shop. To avoid misunderstandings: Cibulka's book also was censored, some passages were deleted upon an agreement between the author and the publishing house, such as remarks about the nuclear power plant in the northern GDR, Lubmin near Greifswald,

which Cibulka linked with passages in the literature on nuclear power plants in Western countries. A relatively frank and emotional discussion is carried on about this topic today, even if critical authors are spared no scolding.

In the bimonthly SINN UND FORM, No 1, 1984, Klaus Hoepcke, deputy minister for culture, takes issue with Cibulka's book in which he finds much to object to. He reprimands Cibulka for indiscriminately blaming "the economy" for the precarious environmental situation, though even a child could see that the catastrophic situation in capitalist countries was incomparable with that in the socialist states. "I cannot ignore that environmental questions are approached differently in socialism from capitalism, that here, for example, means created by economic growth are used for also coping better with environmental problems."

There is a grain of truth in this; in fact, the GDR has a comparably progressive set of tools available by which it could fight against environmental problems as they arise. Way back already in 1968, environmental protection was vested in the GDR Constitution, Article 15 saying: "The agencies responsible shall ensure pollution control of waters and the air as well as the protection of flora and fauna and of the scenic beauty of the homeland. This is also the concern of every citizen."

In 1970, the GDR issued an environmental protection law, the "Environmental Policy Act." In 1971, an environmental protection ministry was set up. The 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan first included a comprehensive program for improving air and water quality. Polluters were fined, having to pay "dust and exhaust" money, for instance. That was all very encouraging.

And then came the oil crisis. Crude oil imports had to be cut drastically. Expenditures for environmental protection were scratched. Power plants were converted to using the domestic lignite--excessively stressful to the environment. Then all the progressive environmental protection legislation Hoepcke is referring to today--against his better knowledge--was worth no more than the paper it was printed on. Lignite liquification in power plants, most of them without any desulphurizing installations, led to a sulphur dioxide emission reaching maximum values in Europe and destroying large forest areas within a few years. Already in 1981, according to GDR reports, 12 percent of the wooded areas were directly threatened with extinction. On wide areas, soils are already saturated with the residue of pollutants, the landscape is dead. Reforestation programs, if they are successful at all, will take decades and gobble up tremendous funds.

In the Erz Mountains, where the emissions from three industrial conurbations--the southern GDR bezirks, the North Bohemian industrial region, and the Polish heavy industrial complex around Katowice--pour into the forests, Flemming's fears have long become reality. Dead woods, abandoned villages, a haunted moon landscape for miles.

That simply is the price we have to pay for progress, deputy minister for culture Klaus Hoepcke instructs the poet. And the population had been told about it in all frankness. Hoepcke quotes what the GDR's deputy prime minister Hans Reichelt said in February 1983 about making more use of domestic raw materials--that is lignite--for energy production: "That has to do of course with temporarily resorting to agricultural and forestry acreage by open-pit mining, the lowering of the water table, and of course also with the air pollution, especially through dust and sulphur dioxide."

Whether, for all that, the population affected was drawn into this decision-making process, is rather doubtful. That was more of an administrative decision, from the top. Above the heads of those involved. Hanns Cibulka has his fictitious author rear up against such "power thoughts" seeking to dominate men and nature totally. Hearing the word "power," Hoepcke, himself a power holder in the original sense of the word, reacts most sensitively, there he allows no criticism. "I hope not to be accused of too crude a social science and political reaction," he writes in SINN UND FORM, "if I say: inaccuracies in word formations with the term of 'power' we should not permit ourselves--especially at a time when one of the conditions for the existence of humanity is to maintain, consolidate and develop workers and farmers power in the socialist countries."

The power system is sacrosanct; it may never be subjected to a critique. Someone who infringes that unwritten law is called to task at once and unmasked as an enemy of peace.

The deputy minister also turns out to be remarkably thin-skinned in the matter of the nuclear power plants, which Cibulka had approached most cautiously. Yet even the slightest doubt rates as heresy there. At one spot Cibulka writes: "In a nuclear power plant everything is quiet, deadly quiet, energy is produced inaudibly, the combustion process dominates." That right there seems too much of a critique to Hoepcke, inadmissible, insolent, in fact: "The term 'deadly quiet' in this context, in my view, violates the rules of integrity," is how he slaps the author's fingers.

A critique of the deteriorating environmental situation is possible but must always be one of "solidarity," as they are putting it so nicely; it must never, even by chance, touch the system. That would make such discussions then of course hover in empty space; pretty structures devoid of meaning; art for art's sake. Because environmental pollution, heading, and not all that slowly, toward ecological catastrophe, cannot be looked at apart from any given political system. There are causal connections there.

He who blindly sets his stakes on growth rates must not be surprised when trees die and fish perish.

Official's Book Review

East Berlin SINN UND FORM in German Vol 39 No 1, Jan-Feb 84 pp 165-177

[Review by Klaus Hoepcke, GDR deputy minister for culture, of book "Swantow. Die Aufzeichnungen des Andreas Flemming" [Swantow. Andreas Flemming's Notes] by Hanns Cibulka, Mitteldeutscher Verlag, Halle and Leipzig, 1982]

[Excerpts] "Nature calls for an attentive eye and for incessant internal effort if within the heart of the author a 'second world' is to arise of that nature, a world to enrich us with thoughts and enoble us through the beauty the artist sees," thus wrote Konstantin Pastovski, praising Mikhael Prishvin as a man who had such an attentive eye and an author performing such incessant internal effort. Should we hesitate in relating that statement to Hanns Cibulka? We have now encountered the "second world" of the nature around us, as it grew in his heart. He called it "Swantow," and that is also the title of his book.

That "may be imagination, a place that still has to be founded," as he says on the first of 51 diary-like "Notes by Andreas Flemming" that lend the text its structure.

What Flemming one summer long--between late June and early October--sees, thinks, reads, and dreams at that place in the northern GDR, on the island of Ruegen, what he says--while looking out at the Baltic and its coastal landscape--and what he does not say, what he does and what he does not do, all that leads to a calm and almost monotonous plot, as far as events are concerned. In its inherent tension, however, if one properly gets into it, it intensifies into something highly dramatic. The drama comes out of the author's pondering life and the arts. The experiences of his hero Flemming and of his female partner, the problems in artistic efforts, and his reading provide the impulse for it. What he writes down usually transcends the impulse. What has become experience, opinion, surmise, fear or warning, ~~fit~~ to be recorded, invites the reader to ponder it further on his own. And there are elements here where I agree with the author, but also points where I doubt that Cibulka's view is pertinent.

"Seeing is an art," Paustovski entitled an essay in his book "Die goldene Rose. Gedanken ueber die Arbeit des Schriftstellers" [The Golden Rose--Reflections on the Work of the Author]. The sketch on Prishvin from which I quoted above is also included in it. This then is what he says about the art of seeing: "To become all-seeing it is not enough to look around in all directions. Seeing wants to be learned. To see men and the earth correctly can be done only by someone who loves them properly, too." Cibulka's new book strikes me mainly as a school for seeing. Because what and how Flemming sees can hardly fail to impress a reader's eyes.

As subtly, even lovingly, as the wasps are described and the nest they have built above the entrance to the little house where Andreas lives with Liv are described, as constantly as Flemming comes back to talking in his notes about his peaceful compliance with the stinging insects, one may assume that the scene makes a statement. But what about? About our relating to the globe-encircling dangers in which we all live? Maybe even about our relating to those who are causing them? That seems to be somewhat scary to the author himself. For all of a sudden, Flemming not only lets his neighbor, Mrs Krueger, talk, but he takes up what she says and remarks: "I can see, Mrs Krueger said, to you these winged robbers are the most tender creatures on God's earth. We shall talk about it again. You are living in the ignorance of danger." And then: "We are living in the ignorance of danger. That is precisely the word."

How much does this "Swantow" help then in living in the knowledge of danger in the future and hence actively opposing the danger?

In the poetic core of the book, a cycle called "Lagebericht" [Situation Report], the five parts of which are inserted into the text under different dates, which underscores the gradual growth of the poem, and in several diary notes, Flemming's anxieties revolve around the question! "Are we not about to show contempt for the fundamental laws of nature and the interconnection of all things?" That much industrial and urban waste is dumped into the sea fills him with vexing forebodings for the future. He deals critically with the doubling of the lead content in the air in the last 10 years and the increasing nitrate concentration in produce. He is mistrustful of the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

Persuasive warnings that cannot be taken seriously enough are mixed there with skeptical attitudes toward scientific-technical progress that I cannot take seriously because I cannot believe the author wants to freeze mankind to death in the next millenium. If there are some things in the manner of Andreas Flemming's reflections that are not foreseen far enough, the reason for it can be found in the very approach of thinking by which he gets to some of his questions. What is it supposed to mean saying about man today, because he can draw cones, circles, and parallelograms and can calculate, that he is "calculating" his way through life? There the author toys with the ambiguity of the term. I think he should have noticed that the result does not work in artistic terms. And wherein lies, I beg of you, the enlightened meaning in the poem that says: "We redeem ourselves from looking at dead fish by growth rates of the economy"? Growth rates here--in a poem--are likely meant as a metaphor, and metaphors always exaggerate, such, plainly, is their nature. Metaphorically then, we presumably are to take these "growth rates" for something like this: dubious aspects of "well-being," questionable needs. And here I doubt, with all my respect for metaphors, that the "growth" concept in this context was a fortunate choice. While I find Cibulka's ecological concern, as expressed through Flemming's notes, justified in many respects and share his worry about the large and small rivers on our continent, e.g., I still find myself in conformity with the social forces and state organs in our republic. And I know a lot that is being done to improve the environmental situation. All the more likely one will understand that my opposition to Cibulka always begins at the spot where his worry flies off into the illusion the salvation could come from some life-style opposing "the economy" and "science" and their development. I cannot ignore that environmental questions are approached differently in socialism from capitalism, that here, for example, means created by economic growth are also used for coping better with environmental problems.

Cibulka has Flemming write: "Mán is fully responsible for his thoughts and acts. No government, no people, and no individual can evade this responsibility." So far so good. Very fine also the appeal for a "revolution against ourselves, our laziness, our egoism." It only is dubious that then, without any further explanation, "power thoughts" show up in the listing of the things that should have to be surmounted.

Maybe "power thoughts" are meant to be hit as an external mode of relating to nature, as a domination of nature in the commonplace sense, in the sense of making an inconsiderate use of it. I hope not to be accused of too crude a social science and political reaction if I say: inaccuracies in word formations with the term of "power" we should not permit ourselves--especially at a time when one of the conditions for the existence of humanity is to maintain, consolidate and develop workers and farmers power in the socialist countries. Doubts also when it says there it amounted to a "revolution that teaches us to think about man unlike we did before." For at the pain of a hopeless alienation from life we would depart from understanding men as social beings, of whom we know they live with material and intellectual needs who, as Friedrich Engels put it at the grave of Karl Marx, "first must eat, drink, live somewhere and clothe themselves before they can engage in politics, science, art, religion and so forth."

That among the dangers to be opposed that any humanist would take to heart that of a nuclear world war catastrophe or the imperialist aggressions against various nations in the winter and summer of last year are scarcely mentioned in Flemming's summer diary, strikes me as strange for an otherwise so wide awake and sensitively reacting character. I would not suspect his having been blunted. Still we do learn of a dream that made the hero awake from his sleep with fright: nuclear trails are being laid from Rostock to Trieste. To current international political events, however, he seems fairly closed. In the effort to secure peace we neither wish to forget nor neglect the environmental concern for today and tomorrow. But should the interest in the living conditions for mankind in the future not also always be combined with practically participating in the struggle for that mankind can continue to live in peace and gets to the future in the first place? The entry under 27 August addresses the connection that is involved here:

"The industrial states need billions to reconstitute the ecological equilibrium, but the United States of America is heading toward a new arms buildup." Then the author compares the destructive capacity of weapons threatening us today with the strongest weapons used in World War II, and the outcome is the following, almost inconceivable escalation: 10 tons of TNT, the strongest detonation bomb dropped in Europe; 13,000 tons of TNT, the American atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, 25,000,000 tons of TNT, one of the nuclear warheads of today.

"We shall have to resume again," it is stated in Flemming's notes, "the struggle for life in its totality, for universal disarmament in all countries in the world, so that life again becomes a gift received with joy and not passed on, dubiously, to one's children."

What is referred to here as dubious is something any reader can identify with. The escalation from 10 tons to 25 million tons of TNT per warhead is conceivable to minds without any special physics or chemistry knowledge as a dimension of immensely increased terror. That is not so for a different survey of figures recorded by Cibulka. That deals with the physical half-life period of radioactive materials. That comes from a source generally referred to merely as "reading material." For most readers there might be something mysterious about those data. What persons who are knowledgeable in the natural sciences might say about it, the reviewer found out when he, following Flemming's habit, consulted a *Liv* available to him, only that his *Liv* goes by the name of Monika and happens to be a chemist. In a debate about the half-life passages in Cibulka's book she furthermore involved her colleague Edgar. And then she familiarized me with the following considerations:

Nuclear energy and radioactive isotopes are nothing alien to nature. Nuclear processes gigantic in scope are occurring constantly in space. The sun's thermonuclear reactions made life on earth possible in the first place. Natural nuclear and decay processes have had a crucial influence ever since the earth originated, and irrespective of what man has done, on various natural processes such as the formation of the earth's specific heat. Many also know the three radioactive break-down series of thorium and two uranium isotopes and a great number of other elements with radioactive isotopes, including potassium-40. It is assumed that these are radioactive isotopes formed through neutron reactions at the initial stage of our solar system. All that may be left from that time are very long surviving isotopes with a minimum half-life period of the magnitude of the earth's age. Neither men nor animals suffered any damage in their process of evolution from being that close to them.

Radioactive fission products like plutonium-239 and strontium-90 referred to in the book are truly dangerous as initial or end products in military nuclear explosions. Because then they occur without control in unacceptable concentrations as, e.g., in fallout. On the other hand, fission products of this sort virtually do not get into the environment of persons not involved in the process when nuclear processes are used peacefully, only then, to be sure. We have to see to it that it stays that way. Some of the radioisotopes referred to, such as the less dangerous krypton-85, are actually released from the nuclear power plants as exhaust gases into the earth's atmosphere, yet that controlled emission of minute volumes at the current number of nuclear power plants causes no real problems, which can unfortunately not be said of sulphur dioxide emissions from conventional power plants. Tritium, carbon-14 and plutonium-239 are likewise to be regarded, in their minute traces, as natural components of the earth. Their biological half-life periods are known to the most part. And carbon-14, because of its even distribution and favorable physical half-life period, is likely to be known to the interested reader as the so-called carbon-14 dating for prehistoric age determinations.

So much for what another "Liv" had to say of Flemming's reading materials. I took from it, as a recommendation for the hero of the book, to be more selective in the choice of reading material. Thereby I neither wish to say nor mean that the author had failed to look around and study thoroughly the literature on the subject. The "recommendation" refers to what an author, as an artist, may assign to, and have recapitulate by, a literary character of his. Incidentally, Monika and I take offense at some other word from the author's pen. There is one sentence that reads: "In a nuclear power plant everything is quiet, deadly quiet, energy is produced inaudibly, the combustion process dominates." The word "deadly quiet" in this context, it seems to me, violates the rules of integrity.

After excerpts of "Swantow" had been prepublished in NEUE DEUTSCHE LITERATUR 2 years ago, a quarrel ensued over this piece of literature. The author and the publishing house showed themselves well advised in making allowances for some objections. For instance, remarks about a nuclear power plant in the northern GDR, subject to safety regulations that differ from those in nuclear power plants in Western countries and in other states altogether, in a departure from the originally published version, are no longer linked with passages from the literature about nuclear power plants in Western countries. Radio-nuclear stress lower in our place no longer is made to look as if it were as high as elsewhere. Another example: The observation of combat helicopters, "giant metal birds," in flight, and the tensions thereby aroused in human thought, feeling and conduct, are no longer misrepresented as a starting point for "shifting over into aggressiveness."

I would have wished that more thorough thought had been given before the book was published to some notions that place the meaning of scientific work for the future of mankind in doubt. It would have paid off to confront the reader with how science and technology also create conditions for improving environmental protection, in making possible progress that includes that field. That has not been done in the book; and there may well be reasons for that. Could that have been so because the author generally misunderstands the precise, the calculated, the analytic on the one side, and the approximate, hunches or the

unfathomably miraculous, on the other, as rigidly opposed modes of appropriating the world? Only the latter appearing worthy of man to him? The Hofmannsthal motto, the epigraph at the beginning of the book, that it was the weakness of modern man to treat the situation analytically whereby he would dissolve all the magic, could point in that direction. Kleist is probably still right today. He spoke of people who can deal with metaphors and others, with formulas, and he added: "Those who can deal with both are too few; they do not add up to a class." That there are too few who can deal with both also was shown by some contributions to the debate once the "Swantow" prepublication had come out. In spite of verbally differentiating between "literary products" and "epistemological tracts," Hermann Ley, for instance, with whom I agree in criticizing a scientific-pessimistic position and class-indifferent utterances on military-political, revolutionary and power questions, pitched several statements as if he had gotten hold of a body of text to be tested, having to be scanned for various irritants from the bourgeois pluralistic printing press and fashionable irrationalist vitalism whereas, after all, a literary opus calls for a different approach. Mainly it wants and has to be rated on how valid the artistic answers are--in relation to the life of today--which it seeks to supply for the questions raised. If one finds catchphrases that also show up on alien ground, one must find out what sort of role they play in the present context. Looking at previous history constitutes a weighty argument, but even that calls for something extra. Facts and reflections of today's world, and metaphors and other creative devices found with reference to the current situation, have to be dealt with dispassionately.

No sort of argument at all inheres in formulations which, afflicted by a sort of anti-ecological allergy, talk excessively of the all too outworn pollution of air and water. That does sound as if the author regards the exhaustion in a future-oriented reflection on such pollution as well as the, again, overly exhausting decisions and measures meant to reduce the pollution, as amateurs toying with ennui. What then is he going to make of the SED Central Committee Politburo resolution and of the rules laid down by the GDR Council of Ministers on the protection of our forests? And what about all the efforts made on behalf of environmental problems which Hans Reichelt, deputy prime minister of our republic, explained in an interview early in February 1983? That did realistically admit that air quality greatly depends on the energy sources used, the fuels and propellants. And no bones are made about it affecting the environment that we have to rely mainly on domestic energy sources, lignite in our case. "That has to do of course," Reichelt said, "with temporarily resorting to agricultural and forestry acreage by open-pit mining, the lowering of the water table, and of course also with the air pollution, especially through dust and sulphur dioxide." Our government's efforts after the Eighth SED Congress have been, and are, aimed, as he further announced, "at providing all new combustion plants with dust separation techniques or building them afterwards into extant energy production plants." In the last decade we have managed to keep the sulphur dioxide emissions into the air on an even level, to prevent an increase of them, although energy and industrial production were increased considerably. A question of polemics addressed to Hermann Ley: superfluous, satiated?

Commentaries in FRG media on Cibulka's book are pouring forth tendentious superficialities, attempting either to restylize the author into an enemy of progress (Sybille Cramer in German radio) or--by alluding to the changes in the book compared with its prepublication--through speculations on censorship, i.e. political air pollution (Corino, STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG).

Competent scientific authors today are approaching the ecological problems of the present and future with great seriousness. Of the Marxist-Leninist studies on these matters at least two ought to be mentioned that were recently published in our republic: Wadim Sagladin and Iwan Frolow, "Globale Probleme der Gegenwart" [Global Problems of Today], Dietz publishing house, Berlin, 1982, and Erich Hanke, "Ins naechste Jahrhundert. Was steht uns bevor?" [Heading into the Next Century--What Is in Store for Us?] Urania publishing house, Leipzig/Jena/Berlin, 1983. The account of the dangers in both books in many respects resembles the one furnished by Cibulka's Andreas Flemming, and not only in the naming of facts--in that, the books of the scientists, being much more detailed, are even more drastic--but also in the sense of apprehension and the sense of responsibility with regard to some facts.

As to some way out, it would be interesting to see a literary character like Flemming deal with the possibilities Sagladin and Frolow as well as Hanke are discussing. Preserving the existing natural equilibrium in the natural processes by seeking to conserve it may well be an idea Flemming is brooding over between June and October, as far as we know him by now. Would a Flemming, thinking further ahead through cooler periods be able to understand they are untenable? Would he replace them by other ideas where the purposeful development of the socialist social order and the transformation of nature by means of scientific-technical progress, the rational use of the natural resources, environmental protection and the emergence of a new consciousness and attitude by men toward their natural environment, by way of a lengthy contradictory process, blend into one? Those are the traces Leonid Leonov followed decades ago in his great novel, "The Russian Forest."

Continued artistic work on this theme is of great importance. What was it that was expressed by a man of experience who had by chance become a travel companion of Konstantin Paustovski? It can be found in "Seeing is an art": "Man is about to trample and crush the earth. Yet the beauty of the earth is something sacred, something awe inspiring in our social life. It is one of our terminal goals. I do not know what you think but I am convinced of it. Someone who does not understand that cannot actually be a progressive man."

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HUNGARY

DECREASE IN PARTY'S ECONOMIC, ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE URGED

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 4, Apr 84 pp 8-12

[Article by Sandor Lakos, Managing Editor of PARTELET, member of the MSZMP Central Committee: "The Political System and a Quarter-Century of Party Development"]

[Excerpt] The most momentous event since 1968 has undoubtedly been the reform of the economic management system--which proved to be a significant step for the development of all of society as well. The reform expressed the effort of the party that had resolved since 1956 to develop the economy on a domestic basis and to adhere strictly to practicality in its decisions. The reform initiated positive development, brought about good results in the economy, revitalized public life, extended democracy and had great political significance.

The reform of the economic planning system--as stated above--systematically coincides with the political renewal process begun in 1956 which brought about fundamental changes, and also serves to continue this process. We could also say that the period from 1956 to 1968 laid the foundation for progress both in economic conditions and direction of the economy. The MSZMP policy since 1956, that is the fundamental transformation of intra-party relationships, more accurate determination of the contacts between party and state, party and economy, and central and local organizations, recognition of the distribution of interests, and the fostering of local independence together provided fertile ground for this progress. Thus the economic reform is a structural component and continuation of the direction followed since 1956 which at the same time provided new impetus to the entire political system and within it to the development of the party.

The economic reform, this strengthening of indirect management, largely limited the use of administrative methods as compared to earlier periods. The decentralization of decisionmaking, or more accurately its transferral to the levels at which its requirements are optimally weighed, proved to be a significant step not only from an economic, but also from a political point of view.

Discontinuation of the plan breakdown resulted in a different relationship between party and state, and party and economy. We predicted certain consequences from this even in 1968, but we are trying to realize many consequences

now during the further development of the economic management system. For example, such consequences for party and social organization are the new approach to the role and functions of the state and its proprietary sphere of influence, the limited separation of the administrative and economic functions.

Greater appearance of interests, especially diverging interests, accompanies the greater market orientation of the reform. Thus there is a greater need for institutional representation of interests. This requirement is expressed in the new local concept, which places the fundamentals of self-management of a central level, and in the extension of cooperative self-management, among other ways through the expansion of the cooperative form, incorporation of new areas into this form, and increased protection of trade union interests. This is reflected, even if inadequately, in the practice of decision-preparation, which indicates that divergent approaches to identical questions--precisely those alternatives which we have to a certain extent found lacking in our management system--can exist on a socialist basis.

The growth of local autonomy creates new problems and requirements for the party as well. Every element of the political system, and not least the party, must adjust to the new situation in its working methods and approaches. What was merely insufficient or faulty in earlier policy can now become decidedly harmful. We recognized earlier, perhaps in 1956, that change is needed in the party's working method. This realization, however, was slow in being put into practice, and can still not be considered a completed task.

Thus we have reached today's situation. The previously mentioned processes have created the possibility and need for a new step ahead. Brave progress and renewal is necessitated by the international and domestic economic situation, and our internal hardships, but also by the internal logic of our quarter-century of development. In connection with this, the party in the past years has put emphasis on the development of the political system. The Central Committee has debated the election and administrative systems and the work of the trade unions and continues to research the role of representation and cooperation in the political system.

Since the post-1965 development of the political system, significant changes have also taken place in the structure of our society. The ratio and relationship of social classes and strata have changed, and these changes have not been adequately reflected in the working of the institutional system. Among many possible examples, it is enough to point out the increased proportion of youth among workers, and that for instance the trade unions have not yet succeeded in addressing young workers' problems more deeply and successfully. This sense can be applied to the workings of other social and state organs as well.

With the restratification of our society, the grouping of interests among citizens' and workers' groups has been broadened and differentiated. New strata with unique interests appeared in nearly every larger social group, while preexisting groups and strata diversified their interests. Thus, besides the assertion of general interests, and often within this context, more differentiated representation and protection of interests is needed.

In some instances this may mean the expansion of the institutional system with new elements--the developing role of the Chamber of Commerce is a modern example. The essence of the question lies not in the creation of new institutions, however, but in the differentiation of representation and protection of interests within existing ones. The key movement in this effort may be the further development of parliamentary action. Essentially, its forums would be equally suitable for significant decisionmaking in the political line and the representation of group interests. But this is also an important element in the improvement of trade union activity, which requires more definite representation of group interests.

The institutionalization of social processes--despite the undebatable advantages--always comes with the danger that living issues can become gray, routine, static. The political institutional system of socialism is no exception. Thus much depends on its ability to correct, rejuvenate and renew itself.

In the current situation this is particularly timely. In today's society interests play a greater role in the formation of policy, and divergence of interests has also unavoidably grown. We must voluntarily take responsibility for some. As is well-known, we attach central importance to the principle of production fulfillment, thus increasing resulting differentiation. Obviously, this produces conflicts whose resolution is a political question and a qualitative test of the essence of the political system as well. We do not seek conflict, but, objectively speaking, they arise and cannot be avoided. We can strengthen our national unity by recognizing the nature of these conflicts in time and undertaking their solution with open methods. Thus the conflict-resolving mechanisms of the political system must be developed.

The party must continue to avoid making groundless or one-sided decisions. It must be recognized, though, that the conditions for this very important requirement have not been adequately met. Thus more systematic and contextual attention must be focused on the mechanisms of intra-party conflicts of interest. It seems that the possibilities and forums for the expression of different views are secure; the problem is that these opinions are always realized at the most important points of preparation and passing of resolutions.

One of the great points of debate in the sixties and seventies was the relationship of professionalism to democracy. In these debates the opinion was also voiced that democratic organizations--non-professional by nature--lacked the necessary experience, and thus groundless decisions were made. The question by itself oversimplified certain complex relationships (what constitutes experience?), yet it did contain a grain of rationality. In the past decade and a half, the decision preparation mechanism has improved. Today, far-reaching resolutions are usually worked out by commissions comprised of professionals from a broad variety of fields. Such a commission developed the economic management reform, the scientific policy directives and the document concerning CC methods, and it participates in the further development of the economic management system and other activities. This type of decision preparation has been accepted and institutionalized and it has produced basically positive results. To a certain extent, it has bridged or narrowed the real or apparent gap between professionalism and democracy, professionalism and (non-professional) democratic organizations.

Nevertheless, we can only approve those initiatives which institutionally secure the consideration of various interests and viewpoints at important points in preparing and passing resolutions--i.e. consulting experts, recognizing opposing opinions. However, such initiatives and efforts have not yet become widespread. We must also see that the weak points of the operation of large committees have also become conspicuous, and we have not yet overcome them. The identification and collection of opinions can be considered solved; their conflicts and reconciliation are much farther from solution. The synthesis and objective extension of opinions has not been adequately developed; this must be changed.

This situation to a certain extent corresponds to the well-known and apparently the greatest weakness of party activity: the pervasive official attitude and style, concentration on resolutions and proposals--in other words, papercentricity--which first dims the spirit of the movement and secondly blocks out the meaningfulness, the systematic management of interests, which in turn is the essence of politics.

We should also improve cadre work. It is desirable to create more effective institutional guarantees against the widespread subjectivity, in order that our activity may become more objective and open. Very important in this respect are the forms already in practice: for example, plural nominations for filling party offices, which has brought positive results and utilization of certain aspects of rotation equally in political and non-political spheres. It seems that proper efforts have been made in this field and deserve support.

The evaluation of the role of party and state organs is a recurrent problem in our political system. Frequently, non-desired and non-useful issues are brought to the forefront in such evaluation. Today's debates center not on the presence or absence of the state, but on the form--area by area--of its presence. Naturally, with the important increased self-management of the enterprises, direct, operative intervention is less tolerable than before. This also means that for attainment of our goals, change is also needed in our approach, not just in our working methods.

For the further development of social and economic management, it is necessary to reevaluate the state's proprietary, economic and administrative functions. The role must be modified to result in more sensible, optimal division of work and functions between the state and the enterprises. This clearer delineation of functions relates to the debate--from as far past as the sixties--which dissected the interrelation of democracy and authority. In those past debates, these concepts often represented polar opposites. The conceptions being formulated today produce a certain synthesis of these earlier views. Strengthening the democratic elements of social ownership increases dually the democracy of social life and the effectiveness of economic management. This is the essence of the effort to make the proprietary function closer to the ideal of the workers' collective. Such a step represents a qualitatively new task in enterprise activity, which in itself requires deeper reconsideration of the relationship among the state, the party and the national economy.

It is generally accepted that central party organizations must play a decisive role in the development of economic policy, while opinions differ as to the proper institutional and working methods. It is less clear, however, what role the mid-level and lower party organs should play in the direction system. We must first consider at what point in the individual work processes and to what extent the party should attempt to formulate its own position. It seems a generalized demand that qualitatively, the party should occupy a position less often, but occupy it to a deeper, more directed extent. Thus we are not debating whether the presence of the party is or is not necessary in economic management, but rather how it may become more effective.

And here, we must refer to an understated or perhaps little-known relationship: inasmuch as it is expedient for the party to refrain from the administration of certain concrete professional issues, it is desirable and necessary that the party's politically orienting role should grow, among other reasons, because this is the surplus which the party can contribute from its unique position. The essence and function of policy and the underlying task of the party is the evaluation of interests and decisive participation in reconciliation of interests, nor even simply contrasting them; the essence of this activity--in realization of the goals and outlooks of our basic, comprehensive social interests--is the creation of a proper synthesis and the conceptual influencing of processes.

The ideo-political directing role cannot thus be reduced to dissemination of our standpoint, nor to instruction; it means foremost the political treatment of questions. This is what is always, and today especially, very necessary and important, and in which--it seems--we must increase the party's participation.

This skeletal overview of the past quarter-century shows that our party has correctly evaluated and formulated its viewpoint on the political system. As a result, we may look to real, concrete results. But it follows precisely from the main line and style of our policy that both today and in the future, we should concentrate our attention on yet unresolved questions. This is possibly the greatest outcome and moral of the past quarter-century.

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YUGOSLAVIA

EDITORS DEPLORE PUBLICATION OF SATIRICAL PIECE

[Editorial Report] Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian on 25 May 1984, page 8, reports the delayed distressed reaction of the daily's editorial board to the publication of a satirical fable, "The Barrel," on the Sunday humor page in the issue of 20 May, page 12. The board announces that publishing this "vulgar tract" was a mistake and that the humor page will no longer be edited by non-staffer Vasa Popovic, who has been handling the page since 1982.

The editors are clearly looking over their shoulders at this point, and the source of their discomfort is plain: "The Barrel" is anything but subtle, containing unambiguous references to Yugoslavia and its political leadership since the passing of its head of state in 1980. The author, Stevan Zec, is familiar to readers of the illustrated weekly ILUSTROVANA POLITIKA as a frequent assertive contributor of articles on Kosovo issues, national and local scandals, and disparate other topics. The appearance of his satirical piece should lay finally to rest the wistful notion that no de-Titoizing trends are at work in mainstream Yugoslav media and that outsiders, to win the favor of Yugoslavs, need only continue making obeisances to the memory of the deceased leader ad infinitum.

The first-person narrator of "The Barrel" describes himself as one of eight surviving sons of a renowned vintner who, in his youth, had built a massive barrel capable of holding the produce of an entire crop of grapes. The sons were of different mothers, who lived in various places. Whenever a new son was born, "Daddy would accept the child without recriminations or paternity suits."

When the father died at the age of 95, the eight sons had given little thought to the future. As they gathered round to catch his final words of wisdom, he seemed to say, "Sir the wine so that it doesn't spoil...." Only after the father was in the ground did the sons find out that their inheritance has been squandered. The father had wasted his means on their mothers, forcing him to sell off the entire vineyard, which he had leased back from the new owners in the meantime to grow grapes for the wine barrel.

Left with nothing but their barrel, the sons tack eight separate faucets onto it. They are dumbfounded when the higher faucets begin to run dry but are eventually enlightened by a wandering cooper, who slips them the knowledge that nothing can drip out of an empty faucet. The sons decide that this must have been a collective mistake on their part. To correct the situation, they start

pouring water into the barrel at the suggestion of the eldest brother, who at the age of 75 tends to wander off to the nearest village and forget the way back but who is still respected by all his brothers as though everything were in tip-top shape, "because Daddy trained us that way." The sons keep stirring the mixture of wine and water with a big stick, since they had figured out that the wine would go to the bottom and the water to the top if they did not do so.

At present, all the sons are getting by with loans wheedled from the loan sharks in the village. First, they pawned their faucets, then some pieces of metal from the barrel. Finally, the loan sharks demanded a mortgage on the entire barrel.

The narrator, sitting around the barrel and imbibing water undiluted with wine, is now reasonably certain that the father must have said something different on his deathbed, perhaps "Decant the wine" instead of "Stir the mixture."

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